Subject‐Specific League Tables and Students' Application Decisions by Chevalier, Arnaud & Jia, Xiaoxuan
1 
 

















Do applicants to higher education rely on expert judgement about the quality of the course 
when applying? Using application data across UK universities over a period of 8 years, we 
investigate how league tables affect prospective students’ application decisions. We use 
subject specific ranking rather than the commonly used institution level ranking. We find 
that a one standard deviation change in the subject-level ranking score of an institution is 
associated with on average a 4.3% increase in application numbers per faculty. This effect is 
particularly pronounced among faculties with the best scores, and overseas applicants. 
Limits to the number of applications have increased the preponderance of league tables.  
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Higher education is an experience good for which it may a-priori be difficult to evaluate its 
quality, especially when it varies both between but also within provider; i.e. quality might be 
subject specific. Since in the UK higher education quality has been linked to future higher 
earnings for graduates (Chevalier, 2014), there should a strong demand by applicants for 
private third parties evaluations of the said quality. Indeed a number of British media 
publish university league tables1 every summer to help prospective students; each of them 
differs slightly in terms of methodology but all attempt to approximate the quality of degree 
courses based on a set of objective criteria.  
The onus of a league table is to provide information on ‘quality’ that prospective 
students find useful when making their decisions about where to apply. While some in the 
sector view league tables as a limited and somewhat noisy signal of quality (HEFCE, 2008), 
previous research found that an improvement in the rankings is associated with an increase 
in the number of applications received (Sauder and Lancaster, 2006; Bowman and Bastedo, 
2009; Soo and Elliott, 2010; Broecke, 2012), highlighting their importance to prospective 
students. However, the literature relies either on institutional-level rankings or a limited 
group of subject. These may thus be biased if there is heterogeneity in the quality of 
different subject within an institution.  
This paper contributes to the literature in three distinct ways. First, we estimate the 
elasticity of demand for higher education at the subject level and not at the institution level2 
                                                          
1
 The Times university rankings were first published in 1992, the Sunday Times introduced theirs in 1998, the 
Guardian followed in 1999 and the Complete University Guide (the Independent) in 2007. 
2
 A recent manuscript by Gibbons et al (2014) also uses subject level information but relies on the National 
Student Survey, a national survey of finalists, to approximate quality. This measure obviously correlates with 
league table scores since it is used as one of the input in producing them. 
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and assess the extent of the bias in estimates of the ranking effect on application numbers 
resulting from measuring quality at the institution level. 
Second, we investigate whether the relevance of information on degree programme 
quality changes when the institutional framework changes. In particular we examine two 
important changes: i) the 2004 Higher Education Act amended the financing of higher 
education in England and lifted the maximum tuition fees for home and EU students from 
2006 onwards, ii) starting from 2008, the maximum number of choices (university/degree 
programme) per applicant was reduced from 6 to 5. Both events should increase the 
demand for information on quality and thus the demand elasticity with respect to league 
table.   
Third, we test for heterogeneity in the impact of league tables by focusing on different 
types of applicants. In particular, since the UK is one of the main destinations for 
international students we test whether overseas applicants have a greater demand for 
information as they have more limited knowledge of the UK higher education sector.  
Since applicants’ decisions are primarily bound by their preferences for the subject they 
intend to study (Roberts and Thompson, 2007; HEFCE, 2008), we collected data on 
application numbers at the subject level ((Joint Academic Coding System, JACS) for each 
British higher education institution for the period 2004 to 2011, from the Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). UCAS centralises all applications to under-graduate 
courses, as such we observe the universe of applications, apart from prospective students 
applying through clearing. In some of our models, we disaggregate this data by geographic 
origin (home, EU, non-EU) and/or gender of applicants. We match this data on number of 
applicants to subject specific league tables. We rely on the most popular league table, 
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provided free of charge by the Guardian newspaper3. We then use fixed effect models, 
where the identification comes from variations in the subject quality score over the years, 
and estimate that when an institution’s subject ranking score improves by one standard 
deviation, degree application numbers increase on average by 4.3%. There is also 
heterogeneity by institutional regime (reducing the maximum number of applications per 
candidate increased this elasticity), by origin (non-UK domiciled applicants are more 
responsive to changes in the ranking score), by subject groups (Arts applicants are less 
responsive) and by initial position (larger for institutions with higher ranking scores). We 
also report that estimates of the elasticity of demand with regards to quality are biased 
when quality is measured at the institutional level. The results are robust to various 
specifications of time and quality measures. 
The rest of the manuscript is organised as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on the influence of university league tables on higher education demand. The 
third section details the institutional set-up of higher education in the UK and describes the 
data. The fourth section presents the model and research method and section five details 
our findings. The last section provides the conclusion.  
II. Literature review 
 
The literature on university rankings mostly originates from the U.S. and the U.K.. 
Monks and Ehrenberg (1999), Sauder and Lancaster (2006), Griffith and Rask (2007), 
Bowman and Bastedo (2009), Luca and Smith (2013) studied the effect of the U.S. News and 
                                                          
3
 Circulation figures of The Guardian online edition show it surpasses both The Times and The Sunday Times, 
and according to figures released by the newspaper, its annual university guides  attract 370,000 users (online) a 
month. See http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2010/09/13/UniversityGuide.pdf, and 
February 2010 circulation figures for Guardian newspaper online edition 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8588432.stm.   
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World Report Rankings (USNWR) on students’ application decisions and institutions’ 
admission behaviours. The USNWR divides American universities and liberal arts colleges 
into four tiers; institutions in the top tier are ranked, the remaining institutions are listed 
alphabetically per tiers. This literature has generally concluded that improvements in the 
ranking are associated with increased number of applications, increased selectivity and 
increased conversion of accepted applications (Monks and Ehrenberg, [1999], Sauder and 
Lancaster [2006]). Bowman and Bastedo (2009) showed that institutions moving into the 
top tier of the USNWR see a 3.9% increase in the number of applications received, and an 
increase of 1.2 point in incoming students’ average SAT scores. Using individual-level 
applicant data, Griffith and Rask (2007) analysed the effect of USNWR on students’ 
enrolment decisions and report that an institution ranked in the top 20 will see a 0.45% 
change in accepted students’ probability of enrolment for each one unit change in rank. 
Using application data to the top 50 universities, Luca and Smith (2013) estimated the 
impact of USNWR rankings from changes in the ranking methodology, i.e., institutions’ rank 
changed without any change in underlying quality. They find that a one unit improvement in 
rank leads to one percentage point increase in the number of applications. To summarise 
the US findings, the USNWR rankings affects top-tier institutions the most, with the most 
responsive students being the most able.  
For the UK, Broecke (2012) used individual-level data for home applicants and a set of 
different ranking providers, and found that on average an institution experiences a fall of 
100 applications for each 10 places it drops in a league table. His findings also suggest 
heterogeneity in the impact of rankings across applicants; with male, young, Asian, high-
achievers, higher socio-economic classes, and privately educated applicants being more 
responsive. Using student satisfaction scores published in the National Student Survey (NSS) 
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and the Times university rankings as measures of quality, Gibbons et al. (2013) find that a 10 
percentage points increase in NSS score leads to a 2.3% increase in applications, whereas a 
10-percentile improvement in the Times (subject-level) ranking score increases the number 
of applications by 1.5 to 2%. However, they find that NSS score affects applications via its 
impact on universities’ league table positions. In addition, they also found that changes in 
Times (subject-level) rankings matters more to better ranked institutions.   
While most previous studies have relied on static panel and fixed effect models, Soo 
(2013), used dynamic panel data analysis, and found that changes in the Sunday Times 
overall rankings as well as changes in entry requirements have no significant impact on 
applications numbers but found strong inertia in application numbers. Soo and Elliott (2010), 
like us, investigates subject specific rankings but only for overseas students in two subject 
areas: Business and Engineering. From this limited unrepresentative population, they found 
that overseas Business application numbers vary between 0.5% to 0.9% for a one unit 
change in subject rank. We expand this work by looking at all subject and applicant groups. 
 
III. Institutional set-up and Data 
3.1 Institutions 
Higher education reforms since the mid-eighties, particularly after the 1987 White 
Paper and the 1992 Further and Higher education Act, have created an increasingly 
competitive market for higher education in the UK. Applicants have a large number of 
institutions/degree courses to choose from, and institutions compete to attract them. As 
participation to higher education increased throughout the nineties, the model of public 
financing of higher education became un-sustainable; income per under-graduate student 
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dropped from £8,000 in 1980s to £4,850 in 1997 (Wyness et al., 2011). To limit the burden 
of higher education on public finances and improve funding, maintenance grants were 
abolished and an up-front fee of £1000 was applied to new undergraduate students from 
1998 onwards. In 2004, a new round of funding reforms were announced replacing up-front 
tuition fees with a tuition fee of up to £3000 payable from an income-contingent loan 
(Higher Education Act, 2004)4. The tuition fee reforms differ somewhat in Wales and 
Scotland. Tuition fees went up to £3000 in Wales in 2007 but Welsh students studying at 
Welsh institutions benefited from a grant of around £2000 towards their tuition fees till 
20105. Scottish students studying in Scotland benefited from free education but had to pay 
an end of study endowment of £2,000 up to 20076. Institutions in Northern Ireland followed 
the same institutional framework as English institutions during the period of interest. These 
differences in fee regimes will be mostly captured by institution specific time trends and our 
results are robust to restricting the sample to English institutions only7. 
For the period of interest, universities received payments from the central government 
via the Higher Education Funding Councils, based on their number of home and EU students. 
This funding was fixed by the government, implicitly fixing the number of home and EU 
students by institutions. The maximum tuition fees that institutions can charge were also 
fixed. As such, to increase funding, institutions have over time expanded their programmes 
to overseas students for which numbers and tuition fees are not capped. As a result, the 
number of overseas students studying at UK universities almost tripled between 1994/95 
and 2009/10 (Universities UK, 2011). Having less prior information on degree programmes 
                                                          
4
 Further funding reforms were implemented in 2012 which increased the tuition fees cap to £9,000, but this 
does not directly affect the cohorts investigated here. 
5
 For Wales, http://www.studentfinancewales.co.uk/continuing-students/201415-what-financial-support-is-
available/tuition-fee-support.aspx#.VMz7Y2Byb4g, and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-11515828,  
6
 Scottish Parliament Information Centre Briefing on Graduate Endowment,  
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S3/SB_07-54.pdf 
7
 The data does not allow us to distinguish applicants from the 4 constituent countries of the UK, but there is 
little mobility across the Scottish border apart from students from Northern Ireland. 
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at UK universities and paying higher fees, it is possible that they are more reliant on league 
tables as an indicator of quality.  
For full time undergraduate degrees, the U.K. university application process is 
centralised. Prospective students apply via the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service 
(UCAS), which passes their applications to universities for them to decide whether an offer 
is made. Until 2007, each applicant, regardless of domicile was allowed a maximum of six 
program choices (institution-subject). This was reduced to five in 20088. As such we can 
define three regimes: top-up fees and 6 applications until 2005, tuition fees and 6 
applications in 2006 and 2007, and tuition fees and 5 applications since 2008. 
3.2 Data 
The data originate from two main sources: the UCAS annual report which provides 
aggregate level data on application numbers9 by institutions, JACS (Joint Academic Coding 
Systems) subject groups and student origin and gender, and the Guardian subject-level 
rankings across more than 40 different academic disciplines10. We only keep applications to 
full time undergraduate degrees for the years 2004 to 2011. Figure 1 presents the trends in 
the number of applications submitted every year from 2004 to 2011, by applicants’ 
geographic origins. Overall, applications have increased throughout the period of interest to 
reach 2.4 million, with the rise being the steepest for students originating from the EU. The 
two dips in the overall number of applications coincide with the increase in tuition fees from 
£1000 to £3000 in 2006 and the change in the UCAS application systems in 2008 which saw 
                                                          
8
 Applicants to Oxford or Cambridge universities can only apply to one of the two institutions, not both, and 
are further restricted to four choices only. Applicants to medical schools and veterinary schools are also 
limited to four choices. These applications must be completed by the autumn preceding entrance to higher 
education.  
9
 The data excludes clearing applications since those are not centralised via UCAS. 
10
 These were obtained from the education section of the Guardian website with the exception of the 2009 
ranking which we took from the printed edition of the Guardian University Guide. We have not been able to 
track down the Guardian data before 2003. (2004 rankings were published in 2003). 
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the number of choices per applicant restricted from 6 to 5. The trends by origin of 
applicants are fairly similar, even if the levels are very different. 
     [Figure 1 here] 
Although recent surveys suggest an increasing number of prospective students refer to 
league tables before making their decisions (Roberts and Thompson, 2007; HEFCE, 2008), 
such league tables have attracted much criticism about their accuracy and reliability. The 
main gripe with league tables is that the methodology employed changes over time and 
hence they do not capture changes to the true quality of programmes (HEFCE, 2008). For 
this paper, we do not take side in this debate regarding the merit of methodologies used to 
construct league tables but only use them as a source of information available to 
prospective students. Gunn and Hill (2008) find high and significant level of correlation 
between league tables across different publishers (the Telegraph, the Financial Times, the 
Guardian, the Sunday Times and the Times). Our choice of the Guardian league tables to 
conduct this research is no endorsement that it provides a more accurate measure of 
educational quality, but only reflects that it is easily accessible and currently the most 
popular ranking (see footnote 3).  
The methodology behind the Guardian league tables has changed over time (see table 
A1 in Appendix). The most recent set of criteria used to construct them includes expenditure 
per student, student staff ratio, job prospects, value added, entry tariff, course satisfaction 
(from the annual National Student Survey (NSS)), teaching quality (from NSS), and feedback 
(from NSS). Compare to most of the literature we use ranking scores rather than ranks since 
each subject has different numbers of institutions offering them, making rank comparisons 
between subjects meaningless. The National Student Survey became an input in the ranking 
score in 2008 and brought substantial changes to the set of criteria used, which then led to 
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noticeable changes in the mean subject (group)-level ranking scores11. With this in mind, we 
standardised the subject-level Guardian ranking score by year and subject groups in all of 
the regressions, to make the mean value consistent throughout the period.  
Over the period 2004 to 2011, the list of subjects covered by the Guardian league tables 
changed somehow. When subjects were merged, we take the average score across the two 
subjects in the years that they were treated independently to create a consistent series. 
These subject tables were then collapsed further to form new league tables based on the list 
of JACS subject groups used by UCAS, details of which is provided in Appendix 3.  
The Guardian does not rank all UK higher education providers but has a focus on 
institutions catering for full time undergraduate education. It also omits institutions which 
decline to provide the full set of information and courses with less than 35 full-time 
equivalent students. Finally, there were some consolidations of the higher education sector 
over the period; in such cases, we treat the institutions as separate before the merger and 
as a new institution afterwards12. We then merge the UCAS application number and 
guardian league table information taking care that information on league tables published in 
year t (and named Guardian ranking year t+1) is linked to applications in year t+1. The final 
data is an unbalanced panel with gaps; there are 162 institutions across 8 years, and 17 
subject groups in total, which give us a sample of 10,753 observations. The split of 
observations by subject and year is available in Annex 2. Table 1 contains the summary 
statistics of the main time-varying variables (raw data, not standardised) at various levels of 
dis-aggregation, and shows that faculties receive on average 1,400 applications, 16% of 
which are from foreign applicants (EU and Non EU).  
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 We attempted to use change in methodology as an exogenous shock to ranking, independently of true 
quality. To do so, we replicated the 2008 rankings using the 2007 methods. Unfortunately, the information 
publicly provided does not allow to replicate grading scores or ranking. 
12
 Institutions that changed name are recoded as the same institution throughout. 
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    [Table 1 here] 
IV. Model 
We estimate whether the number of applications to a given subject-group (i) at a given 
institution (u) in period (t), yiut is a function of the subject group-level Guardian ranking 
score/ranks (xiut). The main equation depicting the relationship is 
log(yiut)= β1Xiut + αi + δiu + f(Tt) + εiut               (1) 
where: αi is the subject fixed effect, δiu is the faculty fixed effect, where faculty refers to 
subject group i at institution u, f(Ttu) is a function of time that includes either year dummies, 
a linear trend or institution specific trends. Dummies reflecting institutional environment 
(fees regime and maximum number of choices regime) were also added in some 
specifications, and εiut is the random error term. The main coefficient of interest to be 
estimated, β1, represents the percentage change in the number of applications associated 
with a one standard deviation change in the ranking score Xiut (about 8 points in the ranking 
score). 
Any correlation between the ranking score and unobserved variables (such as 
reputation of the faculty, location of the university, etc.) is assumed constant over time and 
accounted for by the faculty-level fixed effect13. Standard errors are clustered at the 
institutional level to control for within-institution correlations14. The model is identified by 
changes in the ranking score for a given faculty over time, as such it is crucial to assess that 
there is enough within faculty variation. This is explored in Figure 2 which plots for each 
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 We use the Hausman test to verify the appropriateness of the specification and the result shows the null 
hypothesis of no systematic difference between fixed and random effects estimates is rejected, which 
confirms fixed effects is preferred as the consistent estimator to be used here. 
14
 Clustering at the faculty/institution level produces similar standard errors.   
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institution/subject pair the mean and standard deviation in Guardian ranking score. The 
average variation is around 8 points with a few outliers, as such subject specific scores 
appear to vary substantially over time.  
[Figure 2 here] 
V. Results 
5.1 Main results 
In Table 2 we present results using different treatment of the time effect. The first column 
uses year dummies to account for year-on-year changes in the number of applications. We 
estimate that when the subject group-level Guardian ranking score improves by one 
standard deviation, the number of applications received increases by 4.2%. In the second 
column, we reduce the flexibility of the model by imposing a linear time trend and dummy 
variables for years under different tuition fees regime and maximum number of applications 
allowed. The fee increase and the cap on number of applications reduced the total number 
of applications by 14% and 21% respectively, but the coefficient estimate for the score 
variable remains the same. In column 3, we estimate the fully flexible model specified above 
and include institution specific linear trends. An F-test of equality of the time trends 
between institutions is rejected, confirming that models using only faculties and year fixed 
effects are biased, as such this is our preferred specification. Note that the R-square also 
doubles when this specification is used. The estimates are extremely stable to the treatment 
of the time effect and range from 4.2% to 4.3% change in application numbers for a one 
standard deviation change in Guardian ranking score.  
- Table 2 here - 
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We then test whether the effect of ranking score on applications has changed over time, 
especially following the aforementioned institutional reforms, tuition fee increase and 
restriction on application choices, which should have increased the demand for information 
about course quality. We thus interact the ranking score with a dummy for the higher fee 
regimes (post-2006) and with a restricted choice dummy (post-2008). Results are presented 
in Table 3 Column 1. Only the interaction of score with the reduction in the number of 
applications per candidate is significant and positive, increasing the elasticity of application 
with respect to quality by 2 percentage points15. In the second column, we report estimates 
for an even more flexible model, using year dummies and their interactions with the ranking 
score. These interactions overall are statistically significant as shown by the F-test, and 
confirm that the demand for quality information sharply increased in the two years 
following the reduction in the number of choices allowed before going back to trend. 
Overall the evidence appears consistent with our assumption that in the short-run the 
demand for information grew when the returns to information increased. 
- Table 3 here - 
We then turn to assessing heterogeneity in the impact of ranking score for applicants of 
different geographic origins (domiciles) and gender. Non-UK students typically have less a-
priori knowledge about the quality of various institutions, so one may expect them to be 
more reliant on external information, as published in various university guides, and 
consequently be more sensitive to changes in the ranking scores. In addition, while EU 
students pay the same fees as home students, those from outside the EU are not publicly 
subsidized and face uncapped tuition fees (typically around £10,000 for this period), which 
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 Additionally, we tested incorporating each interaction separately to the model, the effects are then larger, 
and the change in fees interactions becomes marginally significant. A three-way interaction of fee increase, 
ranking score and limit on choices again reveals positive but not statistically significant results and the three 
ways interactions terms are not substantially different from those presented. 
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should also make them more sensitive to changes in ‘quality’. We split the applicant cells by 
the geographical origin of applicants, and interact the standardised ranking score with 
applicants’ domiciles (Column 3)16. The results confirm that changes in the ranking score 
have a disproportional effect on non-UK students. While a one standard deviation change in 
the ranking score marginally increases the number of British applications by 1.8%, for EU 
and non-EU applicants this stands at 5.8% and 7.4% respectively. Overseas applicants are 4 
times more sensitive to change in quality information which could reflect the higher costs of 
education or their lack of initial information. These differences in the effect of ranking score on 
applications by applicants origin are large and significant different from each other (Chow test 
F=11.93) 
Finally, we test whether there is any heterogeneity in the response to quality 
information changes by gender. To do so, we split the applicant cells by gender and include 
an interaction term of ranking score and gender. The last column in Table 3 reports results 
from this model which reveals no significant difference in behaviour by gender.  
In Table 4, we assess whether the impact of the ranking score differs for applicants to 
different subject groups. For doing so, we interact of each subject group with the 
standardised Guardian ranking score. We find little difference in the responsiveness of 
prospective students to quality score across subject groups. The only exception being 
Creative Arts & Design, which has a slightly different application process, whereby 
applicants provide a portfolio demonstrating their artistic competence. As such, they 
probably gather information about the quality of the institutions at this stage. Alternatively, 
they might have strong preferences for being taught in a given university where the faculty 
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 Conclusions are similar if the analysis is run for each group separately. 
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better match their artistic interest, which could make them less sensitive to changes in 
ranking scores.  
- Table 4 here - 
Finally, we test whether information on educational quality is more valuable when the 
higher education market is more crowded. For doing so, the standardised ranking score is 
interacted with the number of institutions offering the subject (group). The second column 
of Table 4 reports these estimates. We can reject this hypothesis since the number of 
institutions reported in a subject (group)-specific league table does not affect the impact of 
the ranking score. Perhaps this is not entirely surprising, since the subject group used in this 
analysis are quite broad and the model includes subject fixed effects, as such the effect on 
number of institutions is identified from changes in the number of providers per subject 
which does not vary substantially from year to year. 
Finally, we assess possible non-linearity in the relationship between quality score and 
application numbers. More talented applicants who typically apply to better ranked 
institutions may be more sensitive to information that suggests change in `quality’ of those 
institutions. Figure 3 shows estimates of the quality effect at each decile of the quality 
distribution. There is some evidence of non-linearity. The effect of a score improvement in 
quality is greater for departments in the top three deciles of the quality distribution, and 
especially for the top one. Like previous U.S. and British studies have shown for institution 
quality, the impact of information on course quality is non-linear and increases sharply at 
the top, this is also true when quality is measured at the subject level.  
- Figure 3 here -  
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Overall, it appears that the reaction to a change in quality information is broadly similar 
between subjects (with the exceptions of Creative Arts & Design) and gender, and that the 
only heterogeneity originates from applicants’ geographical origin, whereby applicants with 
the least a-priori knowledge of British institutions and paying higher fees are more sensitive 
to quality information. The effects are also much stronger for institutions moving to the top 
deciles of the quality distribution. 
5.2 Robustness checks 
In this section, we conduct various robustness checks of our specification (Table 5). First, 
we assess whether the results are sensitive to the use of rank rather than ranking score. The 
reason for focusing on ranking score is that rank is difficult to interpret when the number of 
Higher Education providers differs between subject groups. To compare with the rest of the 
literature we re-run our favoured specification using subject (group) rank as the 
independent variable, and estimate that a one unit changes in rank is associated with a 0.1% 
change in application numbers (Column 1). The estimated results are rather small compared 
to Soo and Elliott (2010) which may be driven by Soo and Elliott (2010) focus on overseas 
applicants only, a group that has a greater elasticity to quality information.  To attenuate 
our concerns that rank is sensitive to the number of competitors, we change the dependent 
variables to market share in the specific subject group, i.e. we implicitly control for the 
number of competitors (Column 2). This has little effect on the size of the estimated 
coefficient.  
To interpret the size of the coefficients on rank in terms of the number of applications, 
we find that a 10-place change in rank, for an institution with on average 11 subject groups, 
will lead to a fall on average of 183 applications. This is significantly higher than Boecke 
(2012), where a 10 place change in rank is associated with a drop of 100 applications, and is 
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consistent with the hypothesis that institutional level analysis on the impact of rankings 
could be biased due to the fact that they do not account for heterogeneity in the quality of 
different subjects an institution offers. To further test whether applicants put more weight 
to the subject or institution-level ranking score, we include both in the model. The results 
confirm that applicants are more focused on the subject specific quality information. A one 
standard deviation increase in quality score has a 25% larger effect on number of 
applications when quality is measured at the department rather than the institution level. 
This jumps to 50% when ranking score rather than ranking is used as a measure of quality. 
This is consistent with the findings of Roberts and Thompson (2007) that applicants are 
mostly focused on subjects rather than institutions. As such, previous research has largely 
underestimated the effect of quality information on the decision of applicants. 
Finally, as detailed in the institutional set-up, Welsh and Scottish institutions adopted 
different tuition fees regimes compare to their English counterparts during the period of 
interest. We re-run our favoured specification using English institutions only (column 5). The 
estimated coefficient remains very stable and marginally increases to 4.5%, for a one 
standard deviation change in ranking score.   
VI. Conclusion 
Do prospective students care about league Tables? Using data from the UK which allow 
us to observe all applications and detailed information on ranking scores at the subject level, 
we find that a one standard deviation improvement in the subject-level ranking score 
increases the number of applications by 4.3% in our favoured specification. The underlying 
information of the ranking score became more important, as the maximum number of 
choices allowed per applicant was curtailed, and for better ranked faculties. This is 
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consistent with previous findings that change in quality matters especially at the top. We 
find weak evidence of heterogeneity by subject groups but noticeable differences by 
prospective students’ geographic origin. Non-British applicants, especially those paying the 
highest tuition fees, are four times more sensitive to information on the quality of the 
higher education. Finally, previous research, by focusing on institution level ranking, has 
underestimated the effect of league tables on applications; applicants are 50% more 
sensitive to information at the department level than at the university level.  
Should institution care about their ranking? We now conduct some back of the 
envelope calculations to assess the size of the reported effects for an average institution. 
For the period covered in the data, numbers of home and EU students at each university 
were controlled and the only free market was for overseas students (assuming no visa 
restriction). An improvement in the Guardian ranking score of one standard deviation would 
lead to a 7.4% change in overseas applications, or 10.5 additional applications from overseas 
students per faculty, at the mean. With a conversion rate of 17% (computed from UCAS report), this 
loosely translates to an additional two students enrolled and £20,000 additional revenue per 
subject group, which does not appear very substantial. However, recent reforms have 
eliminated the caps on number of home students. Taking our overall estimates, the average 
4.3% change in applications for a one standard deviation improvement in Guardian ranking 
score represents an additional 60 applications received by faculty. Given the current level of 
tuition fees and a conversion rate of applications to students of 20%, this loosely translates 
into a change in income of £108,000 for each subject group per year or £1,512,000 per 
institution, on average, or roughly a 1% increase in income17. The direct immediate impact 
on an institution’s budget from variation in Guardian ranking score thus appears quite 
limited.   
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Number of applications (institutional level) 16744.72 2343.73 10753 
Number of applications (faculty/subject-group level) 1389.52 354.00 10753 
By applicants' domiciles UK 1178.42 309.09 10726 
 
EU (excl. UK) 95.41 48.61 9706 
 
Non EU 142.71 61.10 9641 
By gender                               Male 705.22 157.73 9532 
                                                 Female 812.63 246.53 9840 
Guardian (subject group-level) ranking score  62.84 8.19 10753 
    
Note: Cells report the average application numbers figures for institutions with available 
institution/subject-level ranking information (more specifically, there are 127 institutions with 
available institution-level ranking information, and 162 institutions with available subject group-level 








Table 2: Fixed effects model – Guardian (subject group-level) ranking score and log applications 
numbers 
  ln (applications by faculty) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  
         
ranking score (standardised) 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043***  
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  





x x  
post top-up fees 
 
x x  
5 choices per applicant max 
 
x x  
institution specific trends 
  
x  
Constant 6.639*** 6.546*** 6.546***  
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.005)  
    
 
Observations 10,753 10,753 10,753  
Number of groups 1,554 1,554 1,554  
Adjusted R-squared 0.124 0.120 0.207  
     
F test for institution specific trends - - 1923.60  
(p-value)   (0.0000)  
Note: “Number of groups” refers to observations by institution and subject groups. Degrees of freedom for 






Table 3: Heterogeneity in the effect of Guardian (subject group-level) ranking score by institutional 
regime and applicants’ type 
  
ln (applications by faculty)        ln (applications by faculty and 
applicant group) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)         (4) 
      
ranking score (standardised) 0.032** 0.023 0.018* 0.050*** 
 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) 
ranking score x post top-up fees 0.0024    
 
(0.013)    
post top-up fees -0.135***  -0.174*** -0.174*** 
 
(0.017)  (0.015) (0.015) 
ranking score x 5 choices 0.024**    
 
(0.010)    
5 choices per applicant -0.215***  -0.262*** -0.262*** 
 
(0.013)  (0.014) (0.014) 
2005 x ranking score  0.020   
 
 (0.017)   
2006 x ranking score  0.002   
 
 (0.016)   
2007 x ranking score  0.023   
 
 (0.018)   
2008 x ranking score  0.047***   
 
 (0.018)   
2009 x ranking score  0.043**   
 
 (0.020)   
2010 x ranking score  0.025   
 
 (0.022)   
2011 x ranking score  0.022   
 
 (0.025)   
EU (ex UK) x ranking score    0.040***  
   (0.014)  
Non EU x ranking score    0.056***  
   (0.013)  
female x ranking score     -0.003 
    (0.006) 
Institution specific trends x x x x 
Constant 6.546*** 6.593*** 3.709*** 3.710*** 
 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
    
Observations 10,753 10,753 61,500 61,500 
Number of groups 1,554 1,554 9,126 9,126 
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.212 0.128 0.127 
     
F test for: year  x ranking score - 2.66 - - 
(p-value)  (0.012)   
Chow test for: domicile x 
ranking score - - 11.93 - 
(p-value)   (0.0000)  
     
Note: "Number of groups" refers to observations by institution and subject groups (and domicile and gender in 
column (3) and column (4). Controls for applicants' domiciles (UK, EU(ex UK), Non EU) and gender are included 
in column (3) and column (4). 2004 is the baseline year in column 5. The degrees of freedom for the F-test are 
(7, 161). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at institution levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Heterogeneity in the effect of Guardian (subject group-level) ranking score by subject and 
number of institutions 
VARIABLES                        ln (applications per faculty) 
ranking score (standardised) 0.044* 0.093** 
 
(0.024) (0.038) 










































































post top-up fees x x 
5 choices per application max x x 
institution specific trends x x 
Constant 6.546*** 6.542*** 
 
(0.005) (0.145) 
Observations 10,753 10,753 
Number of groups 1,554 1,554 
Adjusted R-squared 0. 210 0.207 
   
F test of Subject Groups x ranking score 1.79 - 
(p-value) (0.0363)  
Note: "Group L Social Sciences" is the baseline group in column 1. "Number of groups" refers to observations 
by institution and subject groups. Degrees of freedom for the F test in column 1 are (16,161). Robust standard 
errors, clustered at university level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Fixed effect model: subject group/institution rankings and application numbers 


















            




(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
 
 
subject group ranking score 
   
0.0380*** 0.0450*** 











institution ranking score  
   
0.0253*  
    
(0.0144)  
trend x x x x x 
post top-up fees x x x x x 
5 choices per applicant x x x x x 
institution specific trends x x x x x 
Constant 6.602*** -4.891*** 6.646*** 6.553*** 6.593*** 
 
(0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0262) (0.0044) (0.0053) 
     
 
Observations 10,753 10,753 10,434 10,434 8,580 
Number of groups 1,554 1,554 1,491 1,491 1,222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.108 0.199 0.201 0.211 
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Figure 1: Number of degree applications by geographic origin: years 2004-2011 (in thousands)
 
Source: UCAS 2004-2011 
Note: graph based on the total number of degree applications submitted every year, which is the 
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Figure 2: Variation in Guardian ranking score over time (per faculty/institution-subject group)  
 
Source: The Guardian University Guides 2004 – 2011  
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Figure 3: Effect of a change in the (standardised) Guardian score at different points (deciles) of the 
score distribution 
 
Source: The Guardian University Guides and UCAS 2004-2011 
Note: Graph based on the regression of log (applications) on (dummies of) each decile of the Guardian ranking 











D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
log (applications) 




   
A1: Guardian methodologies over the period 







Criteria used 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
(NSS) Course satisfaction 5%
(NSS)Teaching quality 10% 10% 10% 10%
(NSS)Feedback 5% 5% 5% 10%
Staff score 15% 15%
Teaching Quality Assessment 40% 22%
Spend per student 10% 15% 10% 10% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Student Staff ratio 10% 15% 20% 20% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Job prospects 15% 15% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Value added 15% 10% 10% 10% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Entry tariff 10% 15% 20% 20% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Inclusiveness 8% 8% 8%
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A2- Number of institutions for each subject group over the period 
     
  






Group A Medicine & Dentistry 23 25 25 27 30 30 30 30 32 28 
Group B Subjects allied to Medicine 87 88 94 91 85 81 84 87 106 87 
Group C Biological Sciences 110 112 113 114 112 110 110 111 119 112 
Group D Vet Sci,Ag & related 24 29 30 24 18 16 19 19 37 22 
Group F Physical Sciences 92 90 93 89 81 79 79 78 102 85 
Group G Mathematical & Comp Sci 110 109 112 109 108 101 101 105 117 107 
Group H Engineering 89 86 88 81 81 77 79 77 95 82 
Group J Technologies 14 14 14 15 10 10 11 12 23 13 
Group K Architecture,Build & Plan 60 57 59 57 54 48 54 53 66 55 
Group L Social Studies 107 112 112 111 109 102 108 107 120 109 
Group M Law 83 86 89 89 85 85 89 90 96 87 
Group N  Business & Admin studies 110 112 115 116 111 108 110 110 123 112 
Group P Mass Comms and Documentation 60 66 77 77 73 70 73 73 91 71 
Group Q Languages & Linguistics 101 105 106 108 105 98 102 104 114 104 
Group V Hist & Philosophical studies 86 96 97 98 93 88 91 93 104 93 
Group W Creative Arts & Design 111 115 123 118 115 111 113 113 132 115 






A3- Mapping of Guardian subjects, and HESA cost centres to JACS subject groups 
JACS Subject Groups 
(UCAS) 
Subjects (Guardian) Cost centres (HESA) 
Group A Medicine & 
Dentistry 
Medicine, Dentistry (01) Clinical medicine; (02) Clinical 
dentistry 
Group B Subjects allied to 
Medicine 
Anatomy and physiology, Nursing 
and paramedical studies, 
Pharmacology and pharmacy 
(04) Anatomy & physiology; (05) 
Nursing & paramedical studies; (06) 
Health & community studies; (08) 
Pharmacy & pharmacology 
Group C Biological Sciences Biosciences, Psychology, Sports 
and exercise science 
(07) Psychology & behavioural 
sciences; (10) Biosciences; (38) Sports 
science & leisure studies 
Group D Vet Sci,Ag & 
related 
Agricultural and forestry, 
Veterinary science 
(03) Veterinary science; (13) 
Agriculture & forestry 
Group F Physical Sciences Chemistry, Physics, Archaeology 
and forensics, Earth and marine 
sciences, Geography and 
environmental studies 
(11) Chemistry; (12) Physics; (14) 
Earth, marine & environmental 
sciences; (28) Geography; (37) 
Archaeology 
Group G Mathematical & 
Comp Sci 
Mathematics, Computer sciences 
and IT 
(24) Mathematics; (25) Information 
technology & systems sciences & 
computer software engineering 
Group H Engineering Chemical engineering, Civil 
engineering, Electrical & 
electronic engineering, General 
engineering, Mechanical 
engineering 
(16) General engineering; (17) 
Chemical engineering; (19) Civil 
engineering; (20) Electrical, electronic 
& computer engineering; (21) 
Mechanical, aero & production 
engineering 
Group J Technologies Materials and mineral 
engineering 
 
(18) Mineral, metallurgy & materials 
engineering 
Group K Architecture, Build 
& Plan 
Architecture, Building and town 
and country planning 
(23) Architecture, built environment & 
planning 
Group L Social Studies Anthropology, Economics, 
Politics, Sociology, Social work, 
Social policy & administration 
(29) Social studies 
Group M Law Law (29) Social studies 
Group N Business & Admin 
studies 
Business and management 
studies, Tourism, transport and 
travel 
(26) Catering & hospitality 
management; (27) Business & 
management studies 
Group P Mass Comms and 
Documentation 
Media studies, communications 
and librarianship 
(30) Media studies 
Group Q Languages & 
Linguistics 
Classics, English, Modern 
languages & linguistics,  American 
studies 
 (35) Modern languages 
Group V Hist & 
Philosophical studies 
History & history of art, 
Philosophy, Religious studies and 
theology 
(31) Humanities & language based 
studies; 
Group W Creative Arts & 
Design 
Art & design, Drama and dance, 
Music 
(33) Design & creative arts 
Group X Education Educational studies (41) Continuing education; (34) 
Education 
